

*The National Defense Strategy  
of  
The United States of America*



*March 2005*

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## Table of Contents

FOREWORD .....	iii
I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21 <sup>ST</sup> CENTURY .....	1
A. AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD .....	1
B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT .....	2
II. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21 <sup>ST</sup> CENTURY .....	6
A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES .....	6
B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES .....	7
C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES .....	9
III. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES .....	12
A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES .....	12
B. ATTRIBUTES .....	16

## FOREWORD


We live in a time of unconventional challenges and strategic uncertainty. We are confronting fundamentally different challenges from those faced by the American defense establishment in the Cold War and previous eras. The strategy we adopt today will help influence the world's strategic environment, for the United States is an unusually powerful player in world affairs. President George W. Bush is committed to ensuring the security of the American people, strengthening the community of free nations, and advancing democratic reform, freedom, and economic well-being around the globe.

The Department of Defense is implementing the President's commitment to the forward defense of freedom as articulated in the National Security Strategy. This *National Defense Strategy* outlines our approach to dealing with challenges we likely will confront, not just those we are currently best prepared to meet. Our intent is to create favorable security conditions around the world and to continue to transform how we think about security, formulate strategic objectives, and adapt to achieve success.

This strategy emphasizes the importance of influencing events before challenges become more dangerous and less manageable. It builds upon efforts in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) to develop an adaptable, global approach that acknowledges the limits of our intelligence (in all senses of the term), anticipates surprises, and positions us to handle strategic uncertainty.

Since the QDR was released, events have confirmed the importance of assuring allies and friends, dissuading potential adversaries, deterring aggression and coercion, and defeating adversaries. The war on terrorism has exposed new challenges, but also unprecedented strategic opportunities to work at home and with allies and partners abroad to create conditions favorable to a secure international order.

When President Bush took office four years ago, he gave us the mission to prepare the Department of Defense to meet 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges. This strategy is designed to fulfill that mission. Knowing the dedication and capabilities of our uniformed men and women and of the civilians who support them, I am confident we will succeed.



**Donald H. Rumsfeld**  
*Secretary of Defense*

**MAR 1 2005**

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

America is a nation at war. We face a diverse set of security challenges. Yet, we still live in an era of advantage and opportunity.

The *National Defense Strategy* outlines an active, layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests. It seeks to create conditions conducive to respect for the sovereignty of nations and a secure international order favorable to freedom, democracy, and economic opportunity. This strategy promotes close cooperation with others around the world who are committed to these goals. It addresses mature and emerging threats.

### STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

#### **Secure the United States from direct attack.**

We will give top priority to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the United States directly, especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

**Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** We will promote the security, prosperity, and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.

**Strengthen alliances and partnerships.** We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us. We will help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.

**Establish favorable security conditions.** Working with others in the U.S. Government, we will create conditions for a favorable international system by honoring our security commitments and working with other nations to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.

### HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES

**Assure allies and friends.** We will provide assurance by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our alliance and other defense commitments and help protect common interests.

**Dissuade potential adversaries.** We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by developing our own key military advantages.

**Deter aggression and counter coercion.** We will deter by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on favorable terms.

**Defeat adversaries.** At the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security.

### IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

Four guidelines structure our strategic planning and decision-making.

**Active, layered defense.** We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward, and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.

**Continuous transformation.** We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.

**Capabilities-based approach.** We will operationalize this strategy to address mature and emerging challenges by setting priorities among competing capabilities.

**Managing risks.** We will consider the full range of risks associated with resources and operations and manage clear tradeoffs across the Department.

# **NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

## **I. AMERICA'S SECURITY IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY**

### **A. AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE WORLD**

America is a nation at war. We face a diverse set of security challenges.

Yet, we still live in an era of advantage and opportunity. We also possess uniquely effective military capabilities that we are seeking to transform to meet future challenges.

As directed by the President in his 2002 *National Security Strategy*, we will use our position "to build a safer, better world that favors human freedom, democracy, and free enterprise." Our security and that of our international partners—our allies and friends—is based on a common commitment to peace, freedom, and economic opportunity. In cooperation with our international partners, we can build a more peaceful and secure international order in which the sovereignty of nations is respected.

The United States and its allies and partners have a strong interest in protecting the sovereignty of nation states. In the secure international order that we seek, states must be able to effectively govern themselves and order their affairs as their citizens see fit. Nevertheless, they must exercise their sovereignty responsibly, in conformity with the customary principles of international law, as well as with any additional obligations that they have freely accepted.

It is unacceptable for regimes to use the principle of sovereignty as a shield behind which they claim to be free to engage in activities that pose enormous threats to their

citizens, neighbors, or the rest of the international community.

While the security threats of the 20<sup>th</sup> century arose from powerful states that embarked on aggressive courses, the key dimensions of the 21<sup>st</sup> century—globalization and the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—mean great dangers may arise in and emanate from relatively weak states and ungoverned areas. The U.S., its allies, and partners must remain vigilant to those states that lack the capacity to govern activity within their borders. Sovereign states are obligated to work to ensure that their territories are not used as bases for attacks on others.

Despite our strategic advantages, we are vulnerable to challenges ranging from external attacks to indirect threats posed by aggression and dangerous instability. Some enemies may seek to terrorize our population and destroy our way of life, while others will try to 1) limit our global freedom to act, 2) dominate key regions, or 3) attempt to make prohibitive the costs of meeting various U.S. international commitments.

The United States follows a strategy that aims to preserve and extend peace, freedom and prosperity throughout the world. The attacks of 9/11 gave us greater clarity on the challenges that confront us. U.S. officials and the public saw then that, without resolute action, even more harmful attacks would likely occur in the future. A reactive or defensive approach would not allow the United States to secure itself and preserve our way of life as a free and open society. Thus, the United States is committed to an active defense of the nation and its interests. This new approach is evident in the war on terrorism.

The United States and its partners have made progress in the war on terrorism through an unprecedented level of international cooperation. More than 170 countries are

engaged in activities ranging from freezing terrorist assets to sharing intelligence to providing combat forces for coalition operations. In Afghanistan, a multinational coalition defeated a regime that provided one of the world's principal havens for terrorists. In Iraq, an American-led effort toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein—a tyrant who used WMD, supported terrorists, terrorized his population and threatened his neighbors.

Experience in the war on terrorism has underscored the need for a changed defense establishment—one postured both for extended conflict and continuous transformation. This demands an adaptive strategy, predicated on creating and seizing opportunities and contending with challenges through an active, layered defense of the nation and its interests.

## **B. A CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of today's strategic environment. We can identify trends but cannot predict specific events with precision. While we work to avoid being surprised, we must posture ourselves to handle unanticipated problems—we must plan with surprise in mind.

We contend with uncertainty by adapting to circumstances and influencing events. It is not enough to react to change. This strategy focuses on safeguarding U.S. freedoms and interests while working actively to forestall the emergence of new challenges.

### **1. MATURE AND EMERGING CHALLENGES**

“America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones. We are menaced less by fleets and armies than by catastrophic technologies in the hands of the embittered few.” – *National Security Strategy, September 2002*

The U.S. military predominates in the world in *traditional* forms of warfare. Potential adversaries accordingly shift away from challenging the United States through

*traditional* military action and adopt asymmetric capabilities and methods. An array of *traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive* capabilities and methods threaten U.S. interests:

- **Traditional** challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict.
- **Irregular** challenges come from those employing “unconventional” methods to counter the *traditional* advantages of stronger opponents.
- **Catastrophic** challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of WMD or methods producing WMD-like effects.
- **Disruptive** challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough technologies to negate current U.S. advantages in key operational domains.

These categories overlap. Actors proficient in one can be expected to try to reinforce their position with methods and capabilities drawn from others.

Indeed, recent experience indicates that the most dangerous circumstances arise when we face a complex of challenges. For example, our adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan presented both *traditional* and *irregular* challenges. Terrorist groups like al Qaeda are *irregular* threats but also actively seek *catastrophic* capabilities. North Korea at once poses *traditional, irregular, and catastrophic* challenges. Finally, in the future, the most capable opponents may seek to combine truly *disruptive* capacity with *traditional, irregular, or catastrophic* forms of warfare.

**Traditional Challenges.** These challenges are most often associated with states employing armies, navies, and air forces in long-established forms of military competition. *Traditional* military challenges remain important, as many states maintain capabilities to influence security conditions

in their region. However, allied superiority in traditional domains, coupled with the costs of traditional military competition, drastically reduce adversaries' incentives to compete with us in this arena.

As formidable as U.S. capabilities are against *traditional* opponents, we cannot ignore the challenges that such adversaries might present. Traditional challenges require us to maintain sufficient combat capability in key areas of military competition.

***Irregular Challenges.*** Increasingly sophisticated *irregular* methods—e.g., terrorism and insurgency—challenge U.S. security interests. Adversaries employing irregular methods aim to erode U.S. influence, patience, and political will. Irregular opponents often take a long-term approach, attempting to impose prohibitive human, material, financial, and political costs on the United States to compel strategic retreat from a key region or course of action.

Two factors have intensified the danger of *irregular* challenges: the rise of extremist ideologies and the absence of effective governance.

Political, religious, and ethnic extremism continues to fuel conflicts worldwide.

The absence of effective governance in many parts of the world creates sanctuaries for terrorists, criminals, and insurgents. Many states are unable, and in some cases unwilling, to exercise effective control over their territory or frontiers, thus leaving areas open to hostile exploitation.

Our experience in the war on terrorism points to the need to reorient our military capabilities to contend with such irregular challenges more effectively.

***Catastrophic Challenges.*** In the face of American dominance in *traditional* forms of warfare, some hostile forces are seeking to acquire *catastrophic* capabilities, particularly

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Porous international borders, weak international controls, and easy access to information-related technologies facilitate these efforts. Particularly troublesome is the nexus of transnational terrorists, proliferation, and problem states that possess or seek WMD, increasing the risk of WMD attack against the United States. Proliferation of WMD technology and expertise makes contending with *catastrophic* challenges an urgent priority. Even a single *catastrophic* attack against the United States or an ally would be unacceptable. We will place greater emphasis on those capabilities that enable us to dissuade others from acquiring catastrophic capabilities, to deter their use and, when necessary, to defeat them before they can be employed.

***Disruptive Challenges.*** In rare instances, revolutionary technology and associated military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established concepts of warfare. Some potential adversaries are seeking *disruptive* capabilities to exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages of the United States and its partners.

Some *disruptive* breakthroughs, including advances in biotechnology, cyber-operations, space, or directed-energy weapons, could seriously endanger our security.

As such breakthroughs can be unpredictable, we should recognize their potential consequences and hedge against them.

## 2. CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS

Alongside the four security challenges are far-reaching changes in the international system:

- We continually adapt our defense partnerships.
- Key states face important decisions that will affect their strategic position.

- Some problem states will continue to pose challenges, while others could realize that their current policies undermine their own security.
- Hostile, non-state actors have substantial numbers, capability and influence.

**International Partnerships.** International partnerships continue to be a principal source of our strength. Shared principles, a common view of threats, and commitment to cooperation provide far greater security than we could achieve on our own. Unprecedented cooperation in the war on terrorism is an example of the benefit of strong international partnerships.

Today, the United States and its partners are threatened not just by enemies who seek to oppose us through traditional means, but also by an active spectrum of non-traditional challenges. Key U.S. relationships around the globe are adapting and broadening in response to these changes. Also, we have significantly expanded our circle of security partners around the world.

**Key States.** Several key states face basic decisions about their roles in global and regional politics, economics, and security, and the pace and direction of their own internal evolution. These decisions may change their strategic position in the world and their relationship with the United States. This uncertainty presents both opportunities and potential challenges for the United States. Some states may move toward greater cooperation with the United States, while others could evolve into capable regional rivals or enemies.

Over time, some rising powers may be able to threaten the United States and our partners directly, rival us in key areas of military and technological competition, or threaten U.S. interests by pursuing dominance over key regions. In other cases, if adverse economic, political, and demographic trends continue, large capable states could become

dangerously unstable and increasingly ungovernable, creating significant future challenges.

While remaining alert to the possibility of renewed great power competition, recent developments in our relations with states like Russia and China should encourage a degree of hope. As the President's *National Security Strategy* states, "Today, the international community has the best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where great powers compete in peace instead of continually prepare for war."

**Problem States.** Problem States will continue to undermine regional stability and threaten U.S. interests. These states are hostile to U.S. principles. They commonly squander their resources to benefit ruling elites, their armed forces, or extremist clients. They often disregard international law and violate international agreements. Problem states may seek WMD or other destabilizing military capabilities. Some support terrorist activities, including by giving terrorists safe haven.

As recently demonstrated by Libya, however, some problem states may recognize that the pursuit of WMD leaves them less, not more, secure.

**Significant Non-State Actors.** Countering the military capabilities of state competitors alone cannot guarantee U.S. security. Challenges today emanate from a variety of state and non-state sources. The latter are a diverse collection of terrorists, insurgents, paramilitaries, and criminals who seek to undermine the legitimate governance of some states and who challenge the United States and its interests.

### 3. ASSUMPTIONS FRAMING THE STRATEGY

This strategy is built on key assumptions about the world, the nature of U.S. strengths

and vulnerabilities, and the opportunities and challenges we may see in the coming decade.

### **OUR STRENGTHS.**

The United States will continue to enjoy a number of advantages:

- We will retain a resilient network of alliances and partnerships.
- We will have no global peer competitor and will remain unmatched in traditional military capability.
- We will maintain important advantages in other elements of national power—e.g., political, economic, technological, and cultural.
- We will continue to play leading roles on issues of common international concern and will retain influence worldwide.

### **OUR VULNERABILITIES.**

Nevertheless, we have vulnerabilities:

- Our capacity to address global security challenges alone will be insufficient.
- Some allies and partners will decide not to act with us or will lack the capacity to act with us.
- Our predominant position in world affairs will continue to breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance.
- Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.
- We and our allies will be the principal targets of extremism and terrorism.
- Natural forces of inertia and resistance to change will constrain military transformation.

### **OUR OPPORTUNITIES.**

The future also offers opportunities:

- The end of the Cold War and our capacity to influence global events open the prospect for a new and peaceful state system in the world.
- Positive developments in Iraq and Afghanistan strengthen U.S. influence and credibility.
- Problem states themselves will increasingly be vulnerable to the forces of positive political and economic change.
- Many of our key partners want to deepen our security relationships with them.
- New international partners are seeking integration into our system of alliances and partnerships.

### **OUR CHALLENGES.**

In the framework of the four mature and emerging challenges outlined earlier, we will contend with the following particular challenges:

- Though we have no global peer, we will have competitors and enemies—state and non-state.
- Key international actors may choose strategic paths contrary to the interests of the United States.
- Crises related to political stability and governance will pose significant security challenges. Some of these may threaten fundamental interests of the United States, requiring a military response.
- Internationally—even among our closest partners—threats will be perceived differently, and consensus may be difficult to achieve.

### **AN ACTIVE DEFENSE.**

All this necessitates an *active defense* of the nation and its interests, as explained below and in the *National Military Strategy*.

## II. A DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY

This *National Defense Strategy* outlines how DoD will support broader U.S. efforts to create conditions conducive to a secure international system—as the President's *National Security Strategy* states, a balance of power that favors freedom. Such conditions include the effective and responsible exercise of sovereignty, representative governance, peaceful resolution of regional disputes, and open and competitive markets.

Our strategic circumstances are far different today from those of the Cold War.

Today, we enjoy significant advantages vis-à-vis prospective competitors, including an unprecedented capacity for constructive international leadership.

However, as described in Section I, we remain vulnerable to security challenges. We have learned that an unrivaled capacity to respond to *traditional* challenges is no longer sufficient. The consequences of even a single *catastrophic* attack, for example, are unthinkable. Therefore, we must confront challenges earlier and more comprehensively, before they are allowed to mature.

We aim, by various means, to preclude the emergence of the gravest dangers. The Defense Department's capabilities are only one component of a comprehensive national and international effort. For example, battlefield success is only one element of our long-term, multi-faceted campaign against terrorism. Our activities range from training and humanitarian efforts to major combat operations. Non-military components of this campaign include diplomacy, strategic communications, law enforcement operations, and economic sanctions.

### A. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

**1. Secure the United States from direct attack.** The September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks caused the United States to recognize it was at war. Our enemy is a complex network of ideologically driven extremist actors. They have used various means—and some are working to develop catastrophic capabilities—to terrorize our population, undermine our partnerships, and erode our global influence. The danger of catastrophic violence dictates a new strategic imperative: we will actively confront—when possible, early and at safe distance—those who directly threaten us, employing all instruments of our national power.

*We will give top priority to dissuading, deterring, and defeating those who seek to harm the United States, especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction.*

**2. Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action.** The United States cannot influence that which it cannot reach. Securing strategic access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons:

- Promotes the security and prosperity of the United States;
- Ensures freedom of action;
- Helps secure our partners; and
- Helps protect the integrity of the international economic system.

*We will promote the security, prosperity and freedom of action of the United States and its partners by securing access to key regions, lines of communication, and the global commons.*

**3. Strengthen alliances and partnerships.**

A secure international system requires collective action. The United States has an interest in broad-based and capable

partnerships with like-minded states. Therefore, we are strengthening security relationships with traditional allies and friends, developing new international partnerships, and working to increase the capabilities of our partners to contend with common challenges.

*We will expand the community of nations that share principles and interests with us, and we will help partners increase their capacity to defend themselves and collectively meet challenges to our common interests.*

#### **4. Establish favorable security conditions.**

The United States will counter aggression or coercion targeted at our partners and interests. Further, where dangerous political instability, aggression, or extremism threatens fundamental security interests, the United States will act with others to strengthen peace.

*We will create conditions conducive to a favorable international system by honoring our security commitments and working with others to bring about a common appreciation of threats; a broad, secure, and lasting peace; and the steps required to protect against these threats.*

### **B. HOW WE ACCOMPLISH OUR OBJECTIVES**

**1. Assure allies and friends.** Throughout the Cold War, our military presence and activities abroad upheld our commitment to our international partners. We shared risks by contributing to their physical defense. Now, given new challenges, we aim to assure a growing and more diverse community of partners of that same commitment.

*We will provide assurance by demonstrating our resolve to fulfill our defense commitments and help protect common interests.*

**2. Dissuade potential adversaries.** Would-be opponents will seek to offset our advantages. In response, we seek to limit their strategic options and dissuade them from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, or ambitions.

*We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by sustaining and developing our own key military advantages.*

#### **3. Deter aggression and counter coercion.**

We remain committed to the active deterrence of aggression and coercion. Deterrence derives from our recognized capacity and will to defeat adversaries' attacks, deny their objectives, and dominate at any level of potential escalation. However, as the character and composition of our principal challengers change, so too must our approaches to deterrence.

During the Cold War our deterrent was based necessarily on the threat of a major response after we suffered an attack. In the current era there are many scenarios where we will not want to accept the huge consequences of an attack before responding. Therefore, our deterrence policy in this new era places increasing emphasis on denying enemy objectives by seeking to:

- Prevent attacks (e.g., by destroying terrorist networks); and
- Protect against attacks (e.g., by fielding missile defenses).

While it is harder to deter certain non-state actors, such as terrorists and insurgents inspired by extremist ideologies, even these actors will hesitate to commit their resources to actions that have a high likelihood of failure. Our deterrent must seek to influence these actors' cost/benefit calculations, even as we continue prosecuting operations against them.

*We will deter by maintaining capable and rapidly deployable military forces and, when necessary, demonstrating the will to resolve conflicts decisively on favorable terms.*

**4. Defeat adversaries.** When deterrence fails or efforts short of military action do not forestall gathering threats, the United States will employ military power, together with other instruments of national power, as necessary, to defeat adversaries. In doing so, we will act with others when we can.

In all cases, we would seek to seize the initiative and dictate the tempo, timing, and direction of military operations. Bringing military operations to a favorable conclusion demands the integration of military and non-military actions. When combined, these measures should limit adversaries' options, deny them their means of support, defeat organized resistance, and establish security conditions conducive to a secure peace.

This strategy is intended to provide the President a broad range of options. These include preventive actions to deny an opponent the strategic initiative or preempt a devastating attack; combat operations against a capable and organized military, paramilitary or insurgent adversary; and stability operations that could range from peace-keeping to substantial combat action.

Today's war is against terrorist extremist networks, including their state and non-state supporters. These entities are hostile to freedom, democracy and other U.S. interests, and use terrorism, among other means, to achieve their political goals.

Victory on battlefields alone will not suffice. To win the Global War on Terrorism, the United States will help to create and lead a broad international effort to deny terrorist extremist networks what they require to operate and survive. To defeat the enemy, we must deny them what they need to

survive; in the meantime, we are denying them what they need to operate.

The United States will target eight major terrorist vulnerabilities:

- Ideological support – key to recruitment and indoctrination;
- Leadership;
- Foot soldiers – maintaining a regular flow of recruits;
- Safe havens – ability to train, plan, and operate without disruption;
- Weapons – including WMD;
- Funds;
- Communications and movement – including access to information and intelligence; ability to travel and attend meetings; and command and control; and
- Access to targets – the ability to plan and reach targets in the United States or abroad.

The strategy the United States is pursuing consists of three elements:

**Protecting the homeland.** Each partner nation in the coalition against terrorist extremism has a special interest in protecting its own homeland. The Defense Department contributes to protecting the U.S. homeland by sustaining the offensive against terrorist organizations by:

- Conducting military missions overseas;
- Sharing intelligence;
- Conducting air and maritime defense operations;
- Providing defense support to civil authorities as directed; and
- Ensuring continuity of government.

**Countering ideological support for terrorism.** The campaign to counter ideological support for terrorism may be a decades-long struggle, using all instruments of national power to:

- Delegitimate terrorism and extremists by, e.g., eliminating state and private support for extremism.
- Make it politically unsustainable for any country to support or condone terrorism; and
- Support models of moderation in the Muslim world by:
  - Building stronger security ties with Muslim countries;
  - Helping change Muslim misperceptions of the United States and the West; and
  - Reinforcing the message that the Global War on Terrorism is not a war against Islam, but rather is an outgrowth of a civil war within Islam between extremists and those who oppose them.

The debate within the world of Islam between extremists and their opponents may be far more significant than the messages that non-Muslim voices transmit to Muslim audiences.

Countering the ideological appeal of the terrorist network of networks is an important means to stem the flow of recruits into the ranks of terrorist organizations. As in the Cold War, victory will come only when the ideological motivation for the terrorists' activities has been discredited and no longer has the power to motivate streams of individuals to risk and sacrifice their lives.

**Disrupting and attacking terrorist networks.** The Department disrupts and attacks terrorist networks by:

- Identifying, targeting, and engaging such networks, particularly the Al-Qaeda terrorist network;
- Preventing the exploitation by terrorist organizations of large, ungoverned spaces and border areas; and
- Improving the military counterterrorism capabilities of allies and partners.

*At the direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing—setting the conditions for future security.*

## C. IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES

These are guidelines for the Department's strategic planning and decision-making:

**1. Active, Layered Defense.** The United States will seize the strategic initiative in all areas of defense activity—assuring, dissuading, deterring, and defeating. Our first priority is the defeat of direct threats to the United States. Terrorists have demonstrated that they can conduct devastating surprise attacks. Allowing opponents to strike first—particularly in an era of proliferation—is unacceptable. Therefore, the United States must defeat the most dangerous challenges early and at a safe distance, before they are allowed to mature.

Prevention is thus a critical component of an active, layered defense. We will aim to prevent destabilizing conflict. If conflict becomes unavoidable, we will strive to bring about lasting change to check the emergence of similar challenges in the future.

Preventive actions include security cooperation, forward deterrence, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and non-proliferation initiatives—including international cooperation to interdict illicit WMD transiting the commons. Preventive actions also might entail other military operations—for example, to prevent the outbreak of hostilities or to help defend or restore a friendly government. Under the most dangerous and compelling circumstances, prevention might require the use of force to disable or destroy WMD in the possession of terrorists or others or to strike targets (e.g., terrorists) that directly threaten the United States or U.S. friends or other interests.

The United States cannot achieve its defense objectives alone. Our concept of active, layered defense includes international partners. Thus, among the key goals of the *National Security Strategy* is to work with other nations to resolve regional crises and conflicts. In some cases, U.S. forces will play a supporting role, lending assistance to others when our unique capabilities are needed. In other cases, U.S. forces will be supported by international partners.

Another layer in an active, layered approach is the immediate physical defense of the United States. At the direction of the President, the Department will undertake military missions at home to defend the United States, its population, and its critical infrastructure from external attack. Our missile defense program aims to dissuade adversaries by imposing operational and economic costs on those who would employ missiles to threaten the United States, its forces, its interests, or its partners.

In emergencies, we will act quickly to provide unique capabilities to other Federal agencies when the need surpasses the capacities of civilian responders and we are directed to do so by the President or the Secretary. Under some circumstances, the Department will provide support to outside agencies for one-time events of limited scope and duration.

*We will focus our military planning, posture, operations, and capabilities on the active, forward, and layered defense of our nation, our interests, and our partners.*

2. **Continuous Transformation.** Continuous defense transformation is part of a wider governmental effort to transform America's national security institutions to meet 21<sup>st</sup> - century challenges and opportunities. Just as our challenges change continuously, so too must our military capabilities.

The purpose of transformation is to extend key advantages and reduce vulnerabilities. We are now in a long-term struggle against persistent, adaptive adversaries, and must transform to prevail.

Transformation is not only about technology. It is also about:

- Changing the way we think about challenges and opportunities;
- Adapting the defense establishment to that new perspective; and,
- Refocusing capabilities to meet future challenges, not those we are already most prepared to meet.

Transformation requires difficult programmatic and organizational choices. We will need to divest in some areas and invest in others.

Transformational change is not limited to operational forces. We also want to change long-standing business processes within the Department to take advantage of information technology. And, we are working to transform our international partnerships, including the capabilities that we and our partners can use collectively.

We seek to foster a culture of innovation. The war on terrorism imparts an urgency to defense transformation; we must transform to win the war.

*We will continually adapt how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and work with others.*

### 3. **Capabilities-Based Approach.**

Capabilities-based planning focuses more on how adversaries may challenge us than on whom those adversaries might be or where we might face them. It focuses the Department on the growing range of capabilities and methods we must possess to contend with an uncertain future. It recognizes the limits of intelligence and the

impossibility of predicting complex events with precision. Our planning aims to link capabilities to joint operating concepts across a broad range of scenarios.

The Department is adopting a new approach for planning to implement our strategy. The defense strategy will drive this top-down, competitive process. Operating within fiscal constraints, our new approach enables the Secretary of Defense and Joint Force Commanders to balance risk across traditional, irregular, disruptive, and catastrophic challenges.

*We will operationalize this strategy to address the spectrum of strategic challenges by setting priorities among competing capabilities.*

4. **Managing Risks.** Effectively managing defense risks is central to executing the *National Defense Strategy*.

The 2001 QDR is the Department's vehicle for risk assessment. It identifies the key dimensions of risk and enables the Secretary to evaluate the size, shape, posture, commitment, and management of our armed forces relative to the objectives of the *National Defense Strategy*. It allows the Secretary of Defense to assess the tradeoffs among objectives and resource constraints. The risk framework comprises: *operational risk, future challenges risk, force management risk, and institutional risk*:

- **Operational** risks are those associated with the current force executing the strategy successfully within acceptable human, material, financial, and strategic costs.
- **Future challenges** risks are those associated with the Department's capacity to execute future missions successfully against an array of prospective future challengers.
- **Force management** risks are those associated with managing military forces fulfilling the missions described in this *National Defense Strategy*. The primary

concern here is recruiting, retaining, training, and equipping a ready force and sustaining that readiness.

- **Institutional** risks are those associated with the capacity of new command, management, and business practices.

We assess the likelihood of a variety of problems—most notably, failure or prohibitive costs in pursuit of strategic, operational, or management objectives. This approach recognizes that some objectives, though desirable, may not be attainable, while others, though attainable, may not be worth the costs.

Choices in one area affect choices in others. The Department will make deliberate choices within and across each broad category and will maintain a balance among them—driven by this *National Defense Strategy*.

*We will consider the full range of risks associated with resources and operations and manage explicit tradeoffs across the Department.*

### III. DESIRED CAPABILITIES AND ATTRIBUTES

Our strategy requires a high-quality, joint force. We remain committed to increasing levels of joint competency and capability.

Our goal is not dominance in all areas of military capability, but the means to reduce vulnerabilities while fortifying warfighting advantages. We will:

- Develop and sustain key operational capabilities;
- Shape and size forces to meet near- and mid-term needs;
- Divest and invest for the longer term; and,
- Strengthen our global defense posture to increase our ability to work with other countries on matters of common interest.

#### A. KEY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITIES

Eight operational capabilities are the focus for defense transformation:

1. **Strengthen intelligence.** Intelligence directly supports strategy, planning, and decision-making; it facilitates improvements in operational capabilities; and it informs programming and risk management. Three areas, in particular, are priorities:

- ***Early Warning.*** The first priority is to improve our capacity for early warning. Decision-makers require early warning of imminent crises—e.g., instability, terrorist threat, or missile attack.
- ***Deliver Exact Intelligence.*** We will improve support to intelligence consumers through transformation in both organization and process. Specifically, we aim to increase our capabilities for collection; shift to a more consumer-friendly approach; and better

anticipate adversary behavior through competitive analysis.

- ***Horizontal Integration.*** The intelligence community can play a central role in developing joint solutions. To the extent possible, we seek to fuse operations and intelligence and break down the institutional, technological, and cultural barriers that separate them. This will enable us better to acquire, assess, and deliver critical intelligence both to senior decision-makers and to warfighters.

In addition, counter intelligence also directly supports our strategy, planning, and decision-making. Counter intelligence is critical to defending our information advantage in a number of areas (e.g., technology, operations, etc.)

*We will strengthen our intelligence capabilities and integrate them into operations to inform decision-making and resource planning.*

#### 2. **Protecting critical bases of operation.**

Our premier base of operation is the United States itself. Secure bases of operation make possible our political and military freedom of action, reassure the nation and its partners, and enable the timely generation and deployment of military forces worldwide. Securing critical bases requires actionable intelligence, strategic warning, and the ability to defeat threats—if possible before they are able to mature.

The entire range of strategic threats can put at risk our bases of operation at home and abroad. While we can identify some—e.g., missiles and WMD—others, like those employed against the United States and its partners since 9/11, may be harder to identify. We need to improve defenses against such challenges and increase our capacity to defeat them at a distance.

*We will protect critical bases of operation, including the U.S. homeland, against all challenges.*

### **3. Operating from the global commons.**

Our ability to operate in and from the global commons—space, international waters and airspace, and cyberspace—is important. It enables us to project power anywhere in the world from secure bases of operation. Our capacity to operate in and from the strategic commons is critical to the direct defense of the United States and its partners and provides a stabilizing influence in key regions.

Such capacity provides our forces operational freedom of action. Ceding our historic maritime advantage would unacceptably limit our global reach. Our capacity to operate from international airspace and outer space will remain important for joint operations. In particular, as the nation's reliance on space-based systems continues to grow, we will guard against new vulnerabilities. Key goals, therefore, are to ensure our access to and use of space, and to deny hostile exploitation of space to adversaries.

Cyberspace is a new theater of operations. Consequently, information operations (IO) is becoming a core military competency. Successful military operations depend on the ability to protect information infrastructure and data. Increased dependence on information networks creates new vulnerabilities that adversaries may seek to exploit. At the same time, an adversary's use of information networks and technologies creates opportunities for us to conduct discriminate offensive IO as well. Developing IO as a core military competency requires fundamental shifts in processes, policies, and culture.

*We will operate in and from the commons by overcoming challenges to our global maritime, air, space, and cyberspace operations.*

### **4. Projecting and sustaining forces in distant anti-access environments.**

Our role in the world depends on our effectively projecting and sustaining forces in distant environments where adversaries may seek to deny us access. Our capacity to project power depends on our defense posture and deployment flexibility at home and overseas, the security of our bases, and on our access to the strategic commons.

Adversaries could employ advanced and legacy military capabilities and methods to deny us access. Ultimately, they may combine their most advanced military capabilities with future technologies to threaten our capacity to project power.

Other opponents may employ less sophisticated but effective means either to deny access to us or intimidate others to do so. Their options are numerous, including the innovative employment of legacy capabilities and indirect threats intended to impose unacceptable costs on friendly governments.

*We will project and sustain our forces in distant anti-access environments.*

**5. Denying enemies sanctuary.** Adversaries who threaten the United States and its interests require secure bases. They will use great distance or the sanctuary created by ungoverned territory to their advantage. The more we hold adversaries' critical bases of operation at risk, the more likely we are to limit their strategic options.

A key goal is developing the capability to surge military forces rapidly from strategic distances to deny adversaries sanctuary. In some cases, this will involve discrete Special

Operations Forces (SOF) or precision attacks on targets deep inside enemy territory. In others, sustained joint or combined combat operations will be necessary, requiring the comprehensive defeat of significant state and non-state opponents operating in and from enemy territory or an ungoverned area.

To deny sanctuary requires a number of capabilities, including: persistent surveillance and precision strike; operational maneuver from strategic distances; sustained joint combat operations in and from austere locations, at significant operational depths; and stability operations to assist in the establishment of effective and responsible control over ungoverned territory.

*We will deny our enemies sanctuary by conducting effective military activities and operations in and from austere geographic locations and at varying operational depths.*

#### **6. Conducting network-centric operations.**

The foundation of our operations proceeds from a simple proposition: the whole of an integrated and networked force is far more capable than the sum of its parts. Continuing advances in information and communications technologies hold promise for networking highly distributed joint and combined forces. Network-centric operational capability is achieved by linking compatible information systems with usable data. The functions of sensing, decision-making, and acting—which often in the past were built into a single platform—can now work closely even if they are geographically distributed across the battlespace.

Bringing decisive capabilities to bear will increasingly rely on our capacity to harness and protect advantages in the realm of information. Networking our forces will provide the foundation for doing so. Operations in the war on terrorism have demonstrated the advantages of timely and accurate information, while at the same time

reinforcing the need for even greater joint, interoperable C4ISR.

Beyond battlefield applications, a network-centric force can increase efficiency and effectiveness across defense operations, intelligence functions, and business processes by giving all users access to the latest, most relevant, most accurate information. It also enables “reach-back” by more effectively employing people and capabilities without deploying them forward.

Transforming to a network-centric force requires fundamental changes in processes, policy, and culture. Change in these areas will provide the necessary speed, accuracy, and quality of decision-making critical to future success.

*We will conduct network-centric operations with compatible information and communications systems, usable data, and flexible operational constructs.*

**7. Improving proficiency against irregular challenges.** Irregular conflict will be a key challenge for the foreseeable future. Challenges from terrorist extremist organizations and their state and non-state supporters will involve our forces in complex security problems for some time to come, redefining past conceptions of “general-purpose forces.”

Comprehensive defeat of terrorist extremists and other irregular forces may require operations over long periods, and using many elements of national power; such operations may require changes to the way we train, equip, and employ our forces, particularly for fighting terrorists and insurgents and conducting stability operations.

Working together with other elements of the U.S. Government, allies, and partners (including indigenous actors), we require the capabilities to identify, locate, track, and engage individual enemies and their networks. Doing so will require greater

capabilities across a range of areas, particularly intelligence, surveillance, and communications.

In addition, we will need to train units for sustained stability operations. This will include developing ways to strengthen their language and civil-military affairs capabilities as required for specific deployments.

*We will improve our capability to defeat irregular challenges, particularly terrorism, by re-shaping and balancing the force.*

**8. Increasing capabilities of partner — international and domestic.** Our strategic objectives are not attainable without the support and assistance of capable partners at home and abroad.

Abroad, the United States is transforming its security relationships and developing new partnerships. We are strengthening our own capabilities to support changing relationships, and we are seeking to improve those of our partners, through efforts like the Global Peace Operations Initiative. We want to increase our partners' capabilities and their ability to operate together with U.S. forces.

One of the principal vehicles for strengthening alliances and partnerships is our security cooperation program. It works by:

- Identifying areas where our common interests would be served better by partners playing leading roles;
- Encouraging partners to increase their capability and willingness to operate in coalition with our forces;
- Seeking authorities to facilitate cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense; and,

- Spurring the military transformation of key allies through development of a common security assessment and joint, combined training and education; combined concept development and experimentation; information sharing; and combined command and control.

Security cooperation also is important for expanding international capacity to meet common security challenges. One of our military's most effective tools in prosecuting the Global War on Terrorism is to help train indigenous forces.

At home, we are increasing the capabilities of our domestic partners—local, state, and federal—to improve homeland defense. This Department seeks effective partnerships with domestic agencies that are charged with security and consequence management in the event of significant attacks against the homeland. In doing so, we seek to improve their ability to respond effectively, while focusing the unique capabilities of this Department on the early defeat of these challenges abroad.

The U.S. Government created the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at the State Department to bolster the capabilities of U.S. civilian agencies and improve coordination with international partners to contribute to the resolution of complex crises overseas. The Department is cooperating with this new office to increase the capacity of interagency and international partners to perform non-military stabilization and reconstruction tasks that might otherwise often become military responsibilities by default. Our intent is to focus our efforts on those tasks most directly associated with establishing favorable long-term security conditions.

To that end, the Department will work with interagency and international partners to improve our ability to transition from military- to civilian-led stability operations.

We will capitalize on our security cooperation efforts by working with allies and partners to promote a secure environment in support of stabilization and reconstruction activities.

*We will help international and domestic partners increase their capabilities to contend with complex issues of common concern.*

## **B. ATTRIBUTES**

To execute this strategy, U.S. military forces possess a number of attributes:

### **1. Shape and Size of Military Forces.**

The shape, size, and global posture of U.S. military forces are configured to:

- Defend the U.S. homeland;<sup>1</sup>
- Operate in and from four forward regions to assure allies and friends, dissuade competitors, and deter and counter aggression and coercion;
- Swiftly defeat adversaries in overlapping military campaigns while preserving for the President the option to call for a more decisive and enduring result in a single operation; and,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Homeland Defense activities represent the employment of unique military capabilities at home—at varying levels—to contend with those circumstances described at the conclusion of Section II, C., 1.

<sup>2</sup> Campaigns to “swiftly defeat” the efforts of adversaries are undertaken to achieve a circumscribed set of objectives aimed at altering an adversary’s behavior or policies, swiftly denying an adversary’s operational or strategic objectives, preventing attacks or uncontrolled conflict escalation, and/or rapidly re-establishing security conditions favorable to the United States and its partners. “Swiftly defeating” adversary efforts could include a range of military activities—from stability operations to major combat that will vary substantially in size and duration. Examples of “swift defeat” campaigns include *Operation(s) Desert Storm* and *Allied Force*.

Campaigns to “win decisively” are undertaken to bring about fundamental, favorable change in a crisis region and create enduring results. They may entail lengthy periods of both major combat and stability operations; require regime change, defense, or restoration; and entail significant investments of the nation’s resources and time. “Win decisive” campaigns will vary significantly in size and scope

- Conduct a limited number of lesser contingencies.<sup>3</sup>

These force planning standards have informed decisions to date on the force’s overall mix of capabilities, size, posture, patterns of activity, readiness, and capacity to surge globally. This framework and these standards will be reviewed in the upcoming QDR.

The force planning framework does not focus on specific conflicts. It helps determine capabilities required for a range of scenarios. The Department analyzes the force requirements for the most likely, the most dangerous, and the most demanding circumstances. Assessments of U.S. capabilities will examine the breadth and depth of this construct, not seek to optimize in a single area. Doing so allows decision-makers to identify areas where prudent risk could be accepted and areas where risk should be reduced or mitigated. Importantly, operations related to the war on terrorism span the breadth of this construct.

**Defend the homeland.** Our most important contribution to the security of the U.S. homeland is our capacity to identify, disrupt, and defeat threats early and at a safe distance, as far from the United States and its partners as possible. Our ability to identify and defeat threats abroad—before they can strike—while making critical contributions to the direct defense of our territory and population is the *sine qua non* of our nation’s security.

but will be among the most taxing scenarios. Examples of “win decisive” campaigns include *Operation(s) Just Cause* and *Iraqi Freedom*.

<sup>3</sup> Lesser Contingency Operations are undertaken to resolve or ameliorate particular crisis circumstances and typically describe operations more limited in duration and scope than those outlined above. These operations include military activities like strikes and raids, non-combatant evacuation operations, peace operations, and disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. Lesser contingency operations range in size from major undertakings like *Operation(s) Restore Hope* or *Provide Comfort* to the much smaller, episodic dispatch of U.S. forces to respond to emergency conditions.

**Operate in and from four forward regions.**

Our military presence abroad comprises tailored and increasingly rotational forces operating in and from four forward regions—Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian Littoral, and the Middle East-Southwest Asia. Complemented by our capabilities for prompt global action, our forces overseas help assure partners, dissuade military competition, and deter aggression and coercion.

Our forward deterrence capabilities, in particular, are adaptable forces able to respond rapidly to emerging crises and control escalation on our terms. These forces are complemented by immediately employable global strike, special operations, and information operations capabilities that provide additional options for preventing and deterring attacks.

Our military presence in the four regions does not constrain our capacity to undertake military missions worldwide, nor does it delimit our global interests. For example, we remain steadfast in our commitment to the security of the Americas, yet we require a very small military presence in Central and South America. Our current military presence abroad recognizes that significant U.S. interests and the bulk of our forward military presence are concentrated in the four regions, even as our forces are positioned to undertake military operations worldwide.

**Swiftly defeat adversaries and achieve decisive, enduring results.**

We cannot be certain in advance about the location and specific dimensions of future conflicts. Therefore, we maintain a total force that is balanced and postured for rapid deployment and employment worldwide. It is capable of surging forces into two separate theaters to “swiftly defeat” adversaries in military campaigns that overlap in time.

Further, recent experience highlights the need for a force capable of turning one of two

“swift defeat” campaigns, if the President so decides, into an operation seeking more far-reaching objectives. Accomplishing these goals requires agile joint forces capable of rapidly foreclosing an adversary’s options, achieving decisive results in major combat actions, and setting the security conditions for enduring conflict resolution. We must plan for the latter to include extended stability operations involving substantial combat and requiring the rapid and sustained application of national and international capabilities spanning the elements of state power.

**Conduct lesser contingencies.** Our global interests require our armed forces to undertake a limited number of lesser contingency operations, perhaps for extended periods of time. Lesser contingencies include smaller-scale combat operations such as strikes and raids; peace operations; humanitarian missions; and non-combatant evacuations. Because these contingencies place burdens on the same types of forces needed for more demanding military campaigns, the Department closely monitors the degree and nature of involvement in lesser contingencies to properly balance force management and operational risks.

**2. Global Defense Posture.** To better meet new strategic circumstances, we are transforming our network of alliances and partnerships, our military capabilities, and our global defense posture. Our security is inextricably linked to that of our partners. The forward posture of U.S. forces and our demonstrated ability to bring forces to bear in a crisis are among the most tangible signals of our commitment to the security of our international partners.

Through the 1990s, U.S. forces remained concentrated in Cold War locations—primarily in Western Europe and Northeast Asia. In the Cold War we positioned our forces to fight where they were stationed. Today, we no longer expect our forces to

fight in place. Rather, operational experience since 1990 indicates we will surge forces from a global posture to respond to crises. This recognition, combined with rapid advances in technology, new concepts of operation, and operational lessons learned, is driving a comprehensive realignment of U.S. global defense posture.

The President stated, "A fully transformed and strengthened overseas force posture will underscore the commitment of the United States to effective collective action in the common cause of peace and liberty." Force posture changes will strengthen our ability to meet our security commitments and contend with new challenges more effectively. As we transform our posture, we are guided by the following goals:

- Expanding allied roles and building new security partnerships;
- Developing greater flexibility to contend with uncertainty by emphasizing agility and by not overly concentrating military forces in a few locations;
- Focusing within and across regions by complementing tailored regional military presence and activities with capabilities for prompt global military action;
- Developing rapidly deployable capabilities by planning and operating from the premise that forces will not likely fight in place; and,
- Focusing on capabilities, not numbers, by reinforcing the premise that the United States does not need specific numbers of platforms or personnel in administrative regions to be able to execute its security commitments effectively.

**Key changes to global defense posture.** Key changes in global defense posture lie in five interrelated areas: *relationships, activities, facilities, legal arrangements, and global sourcing and surge.*

**Relationships.** Our ability to cooperate with others in the world depends on having a harmony of views on the challenges that confront us and our strategy for meeting those challenges. Strengthening defense relationships at all levels helps build such harmony.

Changes in global posture seek both to strengthen our relationships with partners around the world and to help cultivate new relationships founded on common security interests. We are transforming many of our alliances to contend with our new circumstances. Command structures are another important part of our relationships and are being tailored to address our new political and operational needs. We also will lower the operational vulnerability of our forces and reduce local social and political friction with host populations.

**Activities.** Our posture also includes the many military *activities* in which we engage around the world. This means not only our physical presence in key regions, but also our training, exercises, and operations. They involve small units working together in a wide range of capacities, major formations conducting elaborate exercises to achieve proficiency in joint and combined operations, and the "nuts and bolts" of providing support to ongoing operations. They also involve the force protection that we and our allies provide to each other.

**Facilities.** A network of forward *facilities* and capabilities, mainly in four critical regions, provides the United States with an unmatched ability to act globally. However, the threat posed by *catastrophic* challenges and the risks of surprise place an even higher premium on the ability to take rapid military action.

To strengthen our capability for prompt global action and our flexibility to employ military forces where needed, we require the capacity to move swiftly into and through

strategic pivot points and remote locations. The new global posture—using main operating bases (MOB), forward operating sites (FOS), and a diverse array of more austere cooperative security locations (CSL)—will support such needs. In addition, our prepositioned equipment and stocks overseas will be better configured and positioned for global employment. We will make better use of “reach-back” capabilities for those functions that can be accomplished without deploying forward.

MOBs are permanent bases with resident forces and robust infrastructure. They are intended to support training, security cooperation, and the deployment and employment of military forces for operations. The more austere facilities—FOSs and CSLs—are focal points for combined training and will expand and contract as needed to support military operations. FOSs are scalable, “warm” facilities intended for rotational use by operational forces. They often house prepositioned equipment and a modest, permanent support presence. FOSs are able to support a range of military activities on short notice. CSLs are intended for contingency access, logistical support, and rotational use by operational forces. CSLs generally will have little or no permanent U.S. personnel assigned. In addition to these, joint sea-basing too holds promise for the broader transformation of our overseas military posture.

Increasing the flexibility and support provided by prepositioned equipment and materiel is another important aspect of our facilities infrastructure. A decade of operational experience indicates that a new, more innovative approach to prepositioned equipment and stocks is needed. Support materiel and combat capabilities should be positioned in critical regions and along key transportation routes to enable worldwide deployment.

Prepositioned capabilities afloat are especially valuable. In addition, single-service prepositioned capabilities will no longer suffice. As in all other aspects of transformation, prepositioning must be increasingly joint in character.

The new posture will be enabled by “reach-back” capabilities—support capabilities that are available remotely rather than in forward theaters. For example, intelligence support, including battle damage assessment, can be provided from outside the theater of operations. Leveraging reach-back capabilities reduces our footprint abroad and strengthens our military effectiveness. We also seek to increase the involvement of our partners in reach-back functions.

**Legal arrangements.** Many of the current legal arrangements that govern overseas posture date from an earlier era. Today, challenges are more diverse and complex, our prospective contingencies are more widely dispersed, and our international partners are more numerous. International agreements relevant to our posture must reflect these circumstances and support greater operational flexibility. They must help, not hinder, the rapid deployment and employment of U.S. and coalition forces worldwide in a crisis.

Consistent with of our partners’ sovereign considerations, we will seek new legal arrangements that maximize our freedom to:

- Deploy our forces as needed;
- Conduct essential training with partners in the host nation; and,
- Support deployed forces around the world.

Finally, legal arrangements should encourage responsibility-sharing between us and our partners, and provide legal protections for our personnel through Status of Forces Agreements and protections against transfers of U.S. personnel to the International Criminal Court.

**Global sourcing and surge.** Our military needs to be managed in a way that will allow us to deploy a greater percentage of our force where and when it is needed, anywhere in the world. Thus, the Department is transitioning to a global force management process. This will allow us to *source* our force needs from a global, rather than regional, perspective and to *surge* capabilities when needed into crisis theaters from disparate locations worldwide. Our global presence will be managed dynamically, ensuring that our joint capabilities are employed to the greatest effect.

Under this concept, Combatant Commanders no longer "own" forces in their theaters. Forces are allocated to them as needed—sourced from anywhere in the world. This allows for greater flexibility to meet rapidly changing operational circumstances.

A prominent consideration in our global posture changes is to move our most rapidly deployable capabilities forward. For example, heavy forces will return to the United States, to be replaced in large part by more expeditionary capabilities such as airborne forces and Stryker brigades. As a result, our immediate response times should be greatly improved.